CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE FAILURE OF AN ACCUSED TO TESTIFY: A DEFENSE STRATEGY—Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981) by Hakes, Patti L.
Western New England Law Review
Volume 5 5 (1982-1983)
Issue 2 Article 7
1-1-1982
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—JURY
INSTRUCTION ON THE FAILURE OF AN
ACCUSED TO TESTIFY: A DEFENSE
STRATEGY—Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288
(1981)
Patti L. Hakes
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Patti L. Hakes, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE FAILURE OF AN ACCUSED TO TESTIFY: A
DEFENSE STRATEGY—Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981), 5 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 227 (1982),
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol5/iss2/7
NOTES 

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE FAILURE 
OF AN ACCUSED TO TESTIFY: A DEFENSE STRATEGy-Carter v. 
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Lonnie Joe Carter was indicted for third degree burglaryl and 
also charged with being a persistent felony offender under the Ken­
tucky recidivist statute.2 At the burglary trial Carter's defense attor­
ney warned him that if he testified in his own behalf, the prosecutor . 
could impeach him by using his record of prior convictions.3 After 
deciding not to testify, defendant requested that the following cau­
tionary instruction4 be given to the jury: ''The defendant is not com­
pelled to testify and the fact that he does not cannot be used as an 
inference of guilt and should not prejudice him in any way."s The 
trial court rejected the request and the defendant was convicted. 
The jury recommended a two year sentence. 6 
On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court rejected the argument 
that the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Con­
stitution required the trial judge to give the requested instruction.7 
The state supreme court held that the instruction would have vio­
1. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 291 (1981). 
2. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080(3) (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1980). "A per­
sistent felony offender in the first degree is a person who is more than twenty-one (21) 
years of age and who stands convicted of a felony after having been convicted of two (2) 
or more felonies." Id. 
3. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 291 (1981). In Kentucky, a judge has discre­
tionary control over the use of prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes. The 
judge cautioned the prosecutor that reversal was a possibility if more than three prior 
convictions were introduced. Id. at 293. 
4. Id. at 294. The cautionary instruction is also known as a failure to testify or a 
limiting instruction. 
5. Id. The recidivist phase of the trial followed, wherein the prosecutor introduced 
evidence of Carter's prior felony convictions. The jury found Carter guilty as a persistent 
felony offender and increased his sentence to a maximum of twenty years. Id. at 295. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
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lated a state statuteS forbidding comment on a defendant's failure to 
testify and that the instruction would have emphasized that peti­
tioner had not testified in his own behalf.9 
Carter appealed the state supreme court's refusal to give the 
cautionary instruction. In Carter v. Kentucky, IO the Supreme Court 
of the United States determined that petitioner had a right to the 
requested instruction under the fifth amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination. The Court also held that a state trial judge was 
constitutionally obligated to give the instruction when a defendant 
requested it. ll 
The Supreme Court rejected the state interest advanced by Ken­
tucky. The State's purported justification for refusing the requested 
instruction was its interest in protecting the defendant from any 
comment on his failure to testify. Kentucky contended that such an 
instruction constituted a direct comment and an emphasis by the 
court on the defendant's silence. 12 The State also argued that be­
cause the jurors were instructed to determine guilt from the evidence 
alone, they were already aware that they could not draw adverse in­
ferences from petitioner's choice to remain silent. 13 
In Carter, the Supreme Court found these arguments unpersua­
sive. The Court stated that jurors do not know the technical mean­
ing of evidence and will notice a defendant's silence. 14 Without an 
instruction, the jurors would draw adverse inferences from the ac­
cused's failure to testify. IS By requiring that the trial court give the 
requested instruction, the Supreme Court emphasized the constitu­
tional interest in protecting the individual's right to be free from self­
incrimination. The Carter Court found that refusal to give the cau­
tionary instruction stripped the privilege against self-incrimination 
of its full force because it increased the danger that the conviction 
could be based upon adverse inferences, rather than upon the evi­
dence presented at trial. I6 
8. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.225 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1980). "In any 
criminal or penal prosecution the defendant, on his own request, shall be allowed to 
testify in his own behalf, but his failure to do so shall not be commented upon or create 
any presumptions against him." Id. 
9. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 295, 299 (1981). 
10. 450 U.S. 288 (1981). 
II. Id. at 300. 
12. Id. at 303. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 303-04. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 305. 
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Carter is a substantial departure l7 from the Court's last discus­
sion on the subject of the cautionary instruction. Three years earlier 
in Lakeside v. Oregon,18 the Court held that giving a cautionary in­
struction over the objection of the defendant did not violate the priv­
ilege against self-incrimination. 19 In Lakeside, petitioner had been 
charged with escape in the second degree.2o The trial judge gave the 
following cautionary instruction over defense counsel's objection: 
"[A] defendant has the option to take the witness· stand to testify 
. . . . If a defendant chooses not to testify, such a circumstance gives 
rise to no inference or presumption against the defendant, and this 
must not be considered ... in determining the question of guilt or 
innocence."21 
The Lakeside Court determined that although there were times 
when it might not be wise for a judge to give the instruction over a 
defendant's objection, each state was entitled to place its own limita­
tions upon a trial judge's discretion.22 Lakeside, therefore, negated 
defense counsel's professional judgment that the instruction not be 
given and left the use of the cautionary instruction to the trial judge's 
discretion as determined by state policy. Carter, on the other hand, 
leaves the choice of the instruction to the defendant and defense 
counsel.23 Therefore, Carter represents a step toward the devitaliza­
tion of Lakeside. Carter demonstrates that the Supreme Court is 
moving toward expansion of the fifth amendment privilege which 
Lakeside previously had narrowed. 
This case note will first explore the background of the fifth 
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Following this in­
troductory information, analysis of the use of the cautionary instruc­
tion as a defense strategy and the due process consequences of 
judiciary control of the cautionary instruction will be considered. 
This note will conclude that Carter satisfies the due process concerns 
17. In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 n.6 (1965) and in Lakeside v. Ore­
gon, 435 U.S. 333, 337 (1978), the Court expressly reserved decision on the issue of 
whether a defendant had a constitutional right to the cautionary jury instruction. 450 
U.S. at 295. 
18. 435 U.S. 333 (1978). 
19. Id. at 340-41. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. Defense counsel 
based his trial strategy specifically on the fact that the defendant had not testified. Coun­
sel was careful to avoid any mention of that fact. Defense counsel, therefore, felt that 
giving the instruction was similar to "waving a red tlag in front of the jury." State v. 
Lakeside, 277 Or. 569, 571 n.l, 561 P.2d 612, 613 n.1 (1977). 
20. 435 U.S. at 334. 
21. Id. at 335. 
22. Id. at 340-41. 
23. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
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regarding the cautionary jury instruction and that the Carter deci­
sion indicates that use of the cautionary instruction is at defendant's 
discretion. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The fifth amendment guarantees that no person will be com­
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.24 This 
guarantee was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth 
amendment in Malloy v. Hogan.2S In Malloy, petitioner had been 
ordered to testify before a referee of an investigative hearing con­
cerning gambling and other criminal activities.26 Petitioner refused 
to testify on the grounds that answering the questions could incrimi­
nate him.27 The hearing referee found petitioner in contempt, rea­
soning that the fifth amendment privilege was not available to a 
witness in a state proceeding.28 The Supreme Court of the United 
States reversed and held that the fourteenth amendment guaranteed 
petitioner the protection of the fifth amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination.29 
Although Malloy did not address the issue of the cautionary in­
struction, the decision laid the foundation for development of the 
instruction by recognizing a broader function of the privilege against 
self-incrimination.30 The Malloy Court broadened the application of 
the fifth amendment privilege in its holding that state application of 
the privilege must be consistent with the federal constitutional stan­
dard: A person has the right to remain silent unless his choice is to 
speak in the unfettered exercise of his own free Will.31 
The Court based its decision on the policy considerations un­
derlying a coerced confession: Courts are constitutionally compelled 
24. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
25. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). In establishing that the same standard must be used in state 
and federal courts to determine the validity of claims arising from the fifth amendment 
privilege, Malloy overruled Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) and Adamson v. 
California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), "both of which had 'adhered to the position that the 
Federal Constitution does not require the States to accord the Fifth Amendment privi­
lege against self-incrimination.''' 450 U.S. at 297 n.1O (quoting Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 
406, 412 (1966». 
26. 378 U.S. at 3. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 8. 
30. See Note, Prosecutorial Comment and Judicial Instruction on a Defendant's Fail­
ureto Test!/)': In SupportofaLiberalApplication ofthe F!fih Amendment, 13 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 261, 274 (1979). 
31. 378 U.S. at 8. 
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to establish guilt by independently secured evidence.32 The same 
policy underlies the cautionary instruction. The purpose of the in­
struction is to direct the jury's attention from any speculation about 
an accused's failure to testify.33 In Malloy, a violation of the right to 
remain silent was perceived as tantamount to coercion and was, 
therefore, prohibited by the fifth and fourteenth amendments.34 The 
Malloy analysis demonstrated that the Court had shifted its empha­
sis from historical concerns for federalism to an emphasis on due 
process and a concern for the free will of the individual.3s 
The Court's perspective turned from state sovereignty toward 
countervailing concerns for due process, yet Malloy did not address 
the issue of whether comment on a defendant's failure to testify 
should be barred by the fifth amendment.36 
In Gr!ftin v. California,37 the Supreme Court dispelled any 
doubts concerning the applicability of Malloy to the issue surround­
ing comments on the failure to testify. In Gr!ftin, the Court reviewed 
whether the prosecution could comment that the defendant's failure 
to testify was an implicit admission of guilt.38 The Court held that 
such comment could not withstand the fifth amendment challenge.39 
The Court reasoned that such comment acts as a penalty and "cuts 
down on the privilege [to remain silent] by making its assertion 
costly."40 
The Supreme Court, in Brooks v. Tennessee,41 relying on Mal­
loy42 and Gr!ftin ,43 struck down a statute requiring that a defendant 
electing to testify do so prior to any other defense witnesses.44 The 
Court held that the state statute was an impermissible restriction on 
32. Id. at 7-8; see Note, supra note 30, at 270-71. 
33. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
34. See Note, supra note 30, at 271. 
35. See id., at 271-72. 
36. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2272, at 425-39 (McNaughton rev. 
ed. 1961); 3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 399, at 47 n.31 (C. Torcia 12th ed. 
1975); Comment, Comment andInference Under the F!fth and Fourteenth Amendments, 25 
OHIO ST. L.J. 578 (1964). 
37. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
38. /d. at 614-15. 
39. Id. at 615. 
40. Id. at 614. 
41. 406 U.S. 605 (1972). 
42. Id. at 609. 
43. Id. at 611. 
44. Id. at 607-12. The statute states that: "The failure of the party defendant to 
make such request and to testify in his own behalf, shall not create any presumption 
against him. But the defendant desiring to testify shall do so before any other testimony 
for the defense is heard by the court trying the case." Id. at 606 n.l (citation omitted). 
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the privilege against self-incrimination because it violated the Mal­
loy principle that a defendant should suffer no penalty for asserting 
his privilege to remain silent.45 The Court understood that penaliz­
ing the accused for declining to speak first impaired his right to re­
main silent,46 thereby making assertion of the right too costly.47 
Brooks reemphasized the due process concerns ofMalloy and Gr!f!in 
that an accused has a privilege to remain silent unless he chooses to 
speak. Neither Gr!lJin nor Brooks, however, directly addressed the 
propriety of a bench instruction admonishing the jury to draw no 
inferences of guilt from a defendant's failure to testify. Even after 
Gr!lJin, in which comment by a prosecutor was proscribed, there ex­
isted a conflict in authority as to whether it was proper for a judge to 
give the cautionary instruction.48 
The Supreme Court had not addressed definitively the constitu­
tionality of the cautionary instruction, thus the lower courts devel­
oped their own theories. Beginning with People v. Brady,49 one line 
of cases interpreted Gr!lJin to stand for the proposition that only ad­
verse comment is prohibited and only those instructions directly au­
thorizing the jury to draw adverse inferences are prevented. 50 These 
cases infer that Gr!lJin expressly prohibits only an instruction by a 
trial judge that a defendant's silence is evidence of guilt. Under this 
reasoning, it is proper for a judge to instruct the jury that no infer­
ences should be drawn from a defendant's failure to testify, whether 
the accused objects or makes no request at all.51 These courts con­
clude that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
will be rendered worthless unless the instruction is given, because the 
jury naturally will presume guilt due to the accused's failure to 
testify.52 
45. Id. at 609. 
46. Id. (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. at 8). 
47. Id. at 610. 
48. Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1335 (1968). 
49. 275 Cal. App. 2d 984, 990-92, 80 Cal. Rptr. 418, 421-22 (1969). 
50. Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1335, 1336 (1968). 
51. See Lakeside, 435 U.S. at 333; Bellard v. United States, 356 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 856 (1966); Coleman v. United States, 367 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1966); 
United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966); 
Blakely v. State, 43 Ala. App. 654, 198 So. 2d 803 (1967); People v. Brady, 275 Cal. App. 
2d at 984, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 418; Harvey v. State, 187 So. 2d 59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), 
cerl. denied, 386 U.S. 923 (1967); Pearson v. State, 28 Md. App. 196,343 A.2d 916 (1975); 
Commonwealth v. Barrett, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 952, 383 N.E.2d 96 (1978); People v. Am­
ston, 10 Mich. App. 718, 160 N.W.2d 386 (1968); see Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1335 (1968). 
52. See People v. Harris, 52 Mich. App. 739, 218 N.W.2d 150 (1974); Green, The 
Failure to Testify Instruction, 14 WILLAMEITE L.J. 43, 45 (1977). 
233 1982) FAILURE OF AN ACCUSED TO TESTIFY 
There are other cases stating that it is an error for a trial judge 
to give the cautionary instruction over a defendant's objection.53 Ac­
cording to these courts, the intent of Gr(ffin was to give full scope to 
the fifth amendment privilege not to testify.54 Giving the cautionary 
instruction over the defendant's objection, therefore, is tantamount 
to making a comment proscribed by Gr(ffin .55 Even a carefully 
drafted instruction will emphasize the fact that an accused has not 
testified and may inadvertently cause the jurors to consider infer­
ences that might not otherwise have been considered. Such an in­
struction highlights a defendant's failure to testify and thus, is a form 
of comment.56 
The latter series of cases asserts that Gr(ffin prohibits courts 
from doing anything to increase the likelihood that the jury will give 
evidentiary weight to defendant's failure to testify.57 This view is 
supported by the rationale that the jury is free to infer whatever it 
wishes from the evidence without assistance from the court. These 
same inferences may not be drawn, however, when the court brings 
the silence into evidence by commenting upon it. 58 The accused 
must then decide whether his failure to testify should be mentioned 
to the jury. The unfettered right 59 in choosing to testify belongs to 
the accused, along with the corollary right to decide whether his si­
lence should be highlighted for the jury's attention.60 
The real cause of the conflict stems from a lack of knowledge 
related to the cautionary instruction's effect on a jury.61 Those 
53. State v. Zaragosa, 6 Ariz. App. 80, 430 P.2d 426 (1967); State v. Cousins, 4 
Ariz. App. 318, 420 P.2d 185 (1966); Russell v. State, 240 Ark. 97, 398 S.W.2d 213 (1966); 
People v. Horrigan, 253 Cal. App. 2d 519, 61 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1967); People v. Molano, 
253 Cal. App. 2d 841, 61 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1967); Gross v. State, 261 Ind. 489, 306 N.E.2d 
371 (1974); State v. Kimball, 176 N.W.2d 864 (Iowa 1970); See Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1335 
(1968). 
54. See, e.g., People v. Horrigan, 253 Cal. App. 2d 519, 521, 61 Cal. Rptr. 403, 405 
(1967); People v. Molano, 253 Cal. App. 2d 841, 847, 61 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824 (1967); State 
v. Kimball, 176 N.W.2d 864, 868 (Iowa 1970). 
55. People v. Molano, 253 Cal. App. 2d 841, 847, 61 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824 (1967); 
Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1335, 1336 (1968). 
56. People v. Molano, 253 Cal. App. 2d 841, 847, 61 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824-25; see 
Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1335, 1336 (1968). 
57. Green, supra note 52, at 46; People v. Molano, 253 Cal. App. 2d 841, 61 Cal. 
Rptr. 821 (1967); People v. Horrigan, 253 Cal. App. 2d 519, 61 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1967); 
People v. Elliott, 241 Cal. App. 2d 659, 50 Cal. Rptr. 757, cerl. denied, 385 U.S. 941 
(1966). 
58. 380 U.S. at 614. 
59. 378 U.S. at 8. 
60. Russell v. State, 240 Ark. 97, 100, 398 S.W.2d 213, 215 (1966). 
61. Green, supra note 52, at 46. 
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judges who trust juries to follow instructions believe that a caution­
ary instruction benefits a defendant. Those judges who doubt a 
jury's ability to give the proper effect to th~ instruction doubt any 
beneficial effect accruing to the defendant by the use of the instruc­
tion.62 Carter is an attempt to provide a much needed resolution to 
these divergent opinions. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Jury Instruction on the Failure to Testify--A Defense Strategy 
In Carter, the Supreme Court found that a defendant has the 
constitutional right to request a cautionary instruction stating that 
his silence cannot be used as an inference of guilt.63 It is now firmly 
established that if a defendant requests a cautionary instruction, the 
trial judge is constitutionally obligated to give it. In addition, Carter 
implies that the defendant, with the aid of counsel, has the right to 
determine whether the instruction should be given at all. 
The defense attorney, throughout the trial, evaluates the jury's 
responses to determine a strategy for the best defense.64 After this 
evaluation, the defense counsel will confer with the defendant and 
together they will determine whether the instruction should be given. 
In contending that the trial judge has the constitutional duty to pro­
tect a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination through the 
use of the cautionary instruction when a defendant seeks its employ­
ment,6S Carter implies that the choice of the instruction belongs ex­
c~usively to the defendant. 
B. Defendant'S Right to Waive the Cautionary Instruction 
A defendant has the· right to waive his privilege against self­
incrimination.66 The decision to waive belongs exclusively to the ac­
cused after full consultation with defense counsel. 67 Because the 
purpose of the cautionary instruction is to protect the privilege 
against self-incrimination68 and because the accused may waive this 
privilege, the accused has the corollary right to waive his constitu­
62. Id. 
63. 450 U.S. at 305. 
64. See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the scope of a 
trial attorney's authority and responsibilities. 
65. 450 U.S. at 303. 
66. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966); Rogers v. United 
States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951) (citing Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896». 
67. I ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, § 4-5.2(a) (1980). 
68. 450 U.S. at 295-305. 
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tional right to the cautionary instruction.69 
Thirty-nine years before Lakeside, the right of a defendant to 
waive his cautionary instruction was supported by Bruno v. United 
States.70 In Bruno, the petitioner, with eighty-seven others, was con­
victed of conspiracy to violate narcotics laws. Although some of his 
co-defendants took the witness stand, Bruno did not testify. Peti­
tioner requested an instruction that no inferences of guilt be drawn 
from a defendant's failure to testify.7) The trial judge refused to give 
such an instruction to the jury. A federal statute,72 stating that a 
defendant's failure to testify could not create any presumptions 
against him, was interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean that the 
defendant not only had an indefeasible right73 to the requested in­
struction but also the choice as to whether the instruction should be 
given at all,14 The Bruno Court, by implication, also gave defendant 
the right to waive his right to the cautionary instruction. The Lake
side Court, however, chose not to adopt this view. 75 
In its reliance on Bruno, the Supreme Court in Carter demon­
strated movement away from Lakeside's narrow interpretation of the 
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The position 
of the Carter Court allowed a defendant the right to waive his privi­
69. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text; Russell v. State, 240 Ark. 97, 
100, 398 S.W.2d 213, 215 (1966); 450 U.S. at 307 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Ste­
vens' concurring opinion in Carter states that the determination of whether a cautionary 
instruction should be given, similar to the decision of whether to testify at all, should be 
made by the defendant. Stevens' opinion is a reassertion of his dissent in Lakeside v. 
Oregon, 435 U.S. at 333, wherein he pointed out that the defendant has a constitutional 
right to waive his fifth amendment privilege to silence without judicial intervention to 
overrule such choice. At the same time, the defendant, by requesting that no cautionary 
instruction be given, should be allowed to waive without leave of the court his fifth 
amendment right to the instruction. The preceding point is based on the premise that the 
instruction exists solely to protect the fifth amendment privilege of silence. Id. at 343-48. 
70. 	 308 U.S. 287 (1939). 
71. 	 308 U.S. at 292. Bruno requested the following additional instruction: 
The failure of any defendant to take the witness stand and testify in his 
own behalf, does not create any presumption against him; the jury is charged 
that it must not permit that fact to weigh in the slightest degree against any such 
defendant, nor should this fact enter into the discussions or deliberations of the 
jury in any manner. 
Id. 
72. Id. The Court relied on the Act of March 16, 1878, ch. 37,20 Stat. 30: "[t)he 
person so charged shall, at his own request but not otherwise, be a competent witness. 
And his failure to make such request shall not create any presumption against him." Id. 
at 292 n.1. 
73. 	 Id. at 292-94. 
74. 	 Id. at 294. 
75. 	 435 U.S. at 342. 
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lege against self-incrimination and, additionally, gave him the corol­
lary right to waive the cautionary instruction. The latter right comes 
into being only by virtue of the privilege against self-incrimination. 
By stating that the defendant controls the u'se of the cautionary in­
struction, Carter removed the discretion given to the trial judge by 
Lakeside. 
C. 	 A Sua Sponte Instruction By The Court Usurps The Function 
Of The Defense Counsel 
Due to the fact that defense counsel was denied the right to 
waive his client's fifth amendment right to the cautionary instruc­
tion, petitioner in Lakeside argued that his constitutional right to 
counsel had been violated. When the judge gave the cautionary in­
struction over the defendant's objection, his action interfered with 
defense counsel's trial tactics, which attempted the "studious avoid­
ance"76 of any reference to the fact that defendant had not testified. 
Defendant argued that issuance of the instruction over his objection 
specifically singled out his failure to testify and was tantamount to 
"waiving a red flag in front of the jury."77 The Lakeside Court dis­
posed of this argument in cursory fashion by stating that it was the 
judge's responsibility to conduct a fair trial.78 The Court found that 
if the instruction itself did not violate the Constitution, then the right 
to counsel under the sixth amendment was not denied when the in­
struction was given.79 The Court further stated that the right to 
counsel did not confer upon defense counsel the power to veto a trial 
judge's discretion.80 The Court, in effect, usurped the function of 
defense counsel when it affirmed the lower court's sua sponte deter­
mination to give the cautionary instruction. 
In conducting a defense, tactical decisions rest with the attorney, 
who should have exclusive control after consultation with his cli­
76. Id. at 341. 
77. Id. at 340; State v. Lakeside, 277 Or. 569, 571 n.l, 561 P.2d 612,613 n.l (1977). 
See 435 U.S. at 345 (Stevens, J., dissenting): 
For the judge or prosecutor to call [the defendant's failure to testify] to the 
jury's attention has an undeniably adverse effect on the defendant. Even if ju­
rors try faithfully to obey their instructions, the connection between silence and 
guilt is often too direct and too natural to be resisted. When the jurors have in 
fact overlooked it, telling them to ignore the defendant's silence is like telling 
them not to think of a white bear. 
Id. 
78. 435 U.S. at 341-42. 
79. Id. at 341. 
80. Id. 
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ent.81 These decisions necessarily arise from the attorney's skill and 
knowledge,82 and are beyond the control of the presiding judge.83 
The American Bar Association (ABA) Standards related to the ad­
ministration of criminal justice state that "[t]he decisions on what 
witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination 
. . . and all other strategies and tactical decisions are the exclusive 
province of the lawyer after consultation with the client."84 When a 
judge controls the use of the cautionary instruction over an attor­
ney's objection, the attorney no longer has control of the tactical de­
cisions utilized to avoid adverse inferences. If the defense requests 
are ignored, then the attorney's defense tactics are preempted by a 
judge who is conducting a defense in contravention of the ABA 
Standards. 
The selection of an attorney determines the sphere of strategies 
that a defendant will possess because law and tradition give the at­
torney the power to bind a defendant to the consequences of trial 
strategies.85 Matters of procedure and trial tactics are all within the 
attorney's general sphere of authority and the client is bound by the 
attorney's choice in these matters.86 Because a defendant is bound 
by his attorney's choice,87 it should not be within a judge's power to 
81. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980) (the Court stated that court proce­
dure that restricts an attorney's tactical decision abridges the constitutional right to coun­
sel); Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Kinsler, 12 Cal. 2d 98, 105-07,81 P.2d 913, 
917-18 (1938) overruled on other grounds, 6 Cal. 3rd 784, 494 P.2d 9 (1972); Timmons v. 
Holmes, 249 Iowa 888,890,89 N.W.2d 371,372 (1958); State v. Ward, 227 Kan. 663, 666, 
608 P.2d 1351, 1354 (1980); State v. Nixon, 223 Kan. 788, 796, 576 P.2d 691, 697-98 
(1978); see also Duffy v. Griffith Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 780, 787, 24 Cal. Rptr. 161, 165 
(1962); Shores Co. v. Iowa Chem. Co., 222 Iowa 347,350,268 N.W. 581, 583 (1936). 
82. Duffy v. Griffith Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 780, 787, 24 Cal. Rptr. 161, 165 (1962) 
(holding that tactical decisions should be made by defense attorneys). 
83. Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 793 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 
850 (1958); Nassif v. District of Columbia, 201 A.2d 519 (D.C. 1964); Bell v. State, 66 
Miss. 192, 5 So. 389 (1889); see Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent 
Difendant, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1434, 1446 (1965). 
84. I ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, § 4-5.2(b) (1980). 
85. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975); United States v. Laura, 607 
F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Konick, 34 Pa. Commw. 502, 506, 383 A.2d 1002, 1004 
(1978); see generally Chused, Faretta and the Personal Difense: The Role ofa Represented 
Difendant in Trial Tactics, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 636 (1977). 
86. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Kinsler, 12 Cal. 2d 98, 106-07, 81 
P.2d 913,918 (1938) (quoting OhIquest v. Farwell & Co., 71 Iowa 231,233,32 N.W. 277, 
279 (1887», overruled on other grounds, 6 Cal. 3rd 784, 494 P.2d 9 (1972); Shores Co. v. 
Iowa Chem. Co., 222 Iowa 347,350,268 N.W. 581, 583 (1936) (quoting 6 c.J. Attorney 
and Client § 146 (1916»; In re Konick, 34 Pa. Commw. 502, 506, 383 A.2d 1002, 1004, 
aJid, 488 Pa. 544 (1978) (citing Commonwealth ex reI. Bell v. Rundle, 420 Pa. 127, 127­
28,216 A.2d 57, 59, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 966 (1966». 
87. See supra note 85. 
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interfere with a choice between proper tactical alternatives made by 
defense counsel. A defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right to 
counsel requires "untrammelled and unimpaired assistance."88 
The force of Lakeside has been diminished by the language of 
Carter .89 In holding that a trial judge has the constitutional obliga­
tion to give the requested instruction, the Carter Court implicitly re­
moved the tactical choice from the trial judge and returned it to the 
defense attorney.90 
D. 	 Judicial Control Of The Cautionary Instruction Violates f)ue 
Process 
Petitioner in Lakeside presented only two arguments: (1) That 
the cautionary instruction violated his fifth amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination; and (2) his sixth amendment right to 
counsel.9 1 In addition, one may view issuance of the cautionary in­
struction over defense objections as violative of the due process right 
to effective assistance of counsel. 
Inherent in due process is the notion of fairness and a right to 
the benefit of counsel at every stage of the prosecution.92 Due pro­
cess is not satisfied through mere formal compliance with proce­
dure,93 thus, a defendant must be given the opportunity to inquire 
into the intrinsic fairness of the criminal process depriving him of his 
liberty even though the process appears proper on the face of the 
record.94 The purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination is 
an attempt to make the judicial process a fair contest95 between the 
state and the individual. In Murphy v. Wateifront Commission, 96 the 
Court found that the privilege placed emphasis on protecting the in­
dividual by requiring the government "to shoulder the entire 
88. United States ex rel Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 1973). 
89. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
90. 450 U.S. at 305. 
91. 435 U.S. at 336. 
92. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 
25 (1972); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940); 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
93. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 175 (1946); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 
446 (1940). 
94. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 175 (1946). 
95. See MCCORMICK'S, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 118, at 252-54 (E. 
Cleary 2d ed. 1972); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 36, § 2251, at 317; Note, supra note 30, at 
273. 
96. 378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
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load."97 
There is conflict between the fifth amendment policy and due 
process when a state is permitted to comment in any way on a de­
fendant's failure to testify, despite defense counsel's request that the 
judge refrain from such comment. The practice of usurping the de­
fense function could encourage adverse jury inferences and thwart 
the balance by unfairly adding to the state's evidence.98 By giving a 
sua sponte cautionary instruction and bringing defendant's failure to 
testify to the jury's attention, the judge upsets the constitutionally 
required balance by denying defendant the due process right to ef­
fective assistance of counsel at the jury instruction stage of the trial. 
Petitioner in Lakeside argued that his sixth amendment right to 
counsel, obligatory on the states by the fourteenth amendment, was 
violated.99 The Court rejected this argument, stating that the right to 
counsel, no matter how fundamental, could not prevent a court from 
instructing the jury on the basic principles of the criminal justice sys­
tem. IOO The Lakeside majority, however, failed to take into account 
the fact that the right to assistance of counsel is the foundation of the 
adversary system of criminal justice. 101 In Powell v. Alabama, 102 the 
Court defined the right to effective assistance of counsel as an impor­
tant aspect of a fair trial within the meaning of the due process 
clause. 103 Justice Stewart's concurrence in Chapman v. Cal!fornia lO4 
extended this concept by describing it as a right so basic to a fair trial 
that its violation is not harmless error. lOS Reversal was therefore 
mandated even in the absence of a particular showing of prejudice 
and even though the defendant was clearly guilty.l06 
There are numerous ways through which a defendant can be 
denied "effective assistance of counsel."107 In Douglas v. Cal!for­
97. 378 U.S. at 55 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 36, § 2251, at 317). 
98. Note, supra note 30, at 290-91; see 435 U.S. at 342-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
99. 435 U.S. at 341. 
100. Id. at 342. 
101. The Supreme Court established that the right to effective assistance of counsel 
is fundamental and essential to a fair trial. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 
339-45 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. 45, 66-68 (1932); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816 (1975); Smith v. 
O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 445-46 (1940); Gros­
jean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). 
102. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
103. Id. at 71. 
104. 386 U.S. 18, 43-44 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
105. Id. 
106. 386 U.S. at 43 (1967) (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927». 
107. United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 201 (1976). 
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nia ,108 in accordance with a state statute, the trial judge was entitled 
to make an ex parte examination of the record to determine whether 
appointment of counsel would be an advantage to the petitioner or 
the appellate court. After the trial court denied the appointment, the 
Supreme Court held that where the merits of an indigent's only ap­
peal were decided without benefit of counsel, due process was 
violated. 109 
The Court's decision in Lakeside, which allowed the trial judge 
to give the cautionary instruction over the defendant's objection, I 10 
is analogous to the constitutional violation of due process in Doug­
las. In Lakeside, it was the judge, not counsel, who determined 
whether there was a need for the cautionary instruction. II I In Doug­
las, judicial intervention in the form of an ex parte determination by 
the judge violated due process. I 12 Because a judge's ex parte deter­
mination of the merits of an appeal violated due process in Douglas, 
a judge's sua sponte determination of the value of a cautionary in­
struction violated due process in Lakeside. 
In Ferguson v. Georgia, 113 the Supreme Court held unconstitu­
tional a Georgia statute permitting a defendant to make an unsworn 
statement while barring him from having his testimony elicited 
under oath in direct examination. 114 The Court found that the ac­
cused had a due process right to the guidance of counsel at every 
step in the trial. I 15 The Ferguson Court, after rejecting the common 
law notion that a person charged with a crime is incompetent to tes­
tify under oath, 116 held that the defendant had the right to be guided 
by counsel in direct examination. I 17 
In Brooks v. Tennessee ,118 a state statute required that a defend­
ant who chose to testify do so prior to any other testimony for the 
defense. 1l9 The Supreme Court invalidated the statute, ruling that 
the decision to testify was not only an important constitutional right, 
lOS. 372 U.S. 353, 354-55 (1961). 
109. Id. at 354-57. 
110. 435 U.S. at 339. 
111. Id. 
112. 372 U.S. at 354-57. 
113. 365 U.S. 570 (1961). 
114. Id. at 592-96. 
115. Id. at 594-95 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 2S7 U.S. at 69). 
116. Id. at 570, 592-96. 
117. Id. at 594-95. 

liS. 406 U.S. 605 (1972). 

119. Id. at 606 n.l. See supra note 44. 
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but also an important tactical decision that should be protected. 120 
The statute at issue in Brooks 121 required the defendant to be 
the first to testify for the defense, or be barred, without the opportu­
nity to first evaluate the tactical wisdom of testifying after consider­
ing the evidence presented by the other defense witnesses. 122 The 
Supreme Court recognized that a defendant might have valid rea­
sons for testifying last. 123 At the close of the state's case an accused 
may not know whether his testimony will be helpful to his case. 124 
Therefore, he may wish to delay the risk of taking the stand until 
after the other defense witnesses have testified. 125 
In reasoning that counsel for the accused cannot be restricted in 
his tactical determination of when a defendant should testify, the 
Brooks Court found that the statute conflicted with defense counsel's 
professional judgment. 126 The defendant, forced to give up the stra­
tegically superior choice of waiting to testify after the other defense 
witnesses, surrendered his due process rights. 127 The Court deter­
mined that the risk of a defendant causing his testimony to conform 
to that of the preceeding witnesses did not override defendant's priv­
ilege to remain silent. 128 
The petitioner'S situation in Lakeside is analogous to Brooks. 
The instruction in Lakeside 129 pressured the defendant to take the 
witness stand in order to avoid the risk that an adverse inferences 
would be drawn from his choice to remain silent.13o Judicial discre­
120. 406 U.S. at 612-13. 
121. See supra note 44. 
122. Id. at 610. 
123. Id. at 609-10. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 612-13. 
127. Id. 

128.. Id. at 611. 

129. 435 U.S. at 335. The trial judge gave the following instruction: 
Under the laws of this State a defendant has the option to take the witness 
stand to testify in his or her own behalf. If a defendant chooses not to testify, 
such a circumstance gives rise to no inference or presumption against the de­
fendant, and this must not be considered by you in determining the question of 
guilt or innocence. 
Id. 
130. Studies on jury instructions in general have shown that a judge's instruction 
can have a significant effect on jurors. Reed, Jury Simulation: The Impact of Judge's 
Instructions andAttorney Tactics on Decisionmaking, 71 1. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 
71 (1980).' A recent national public opinion survey conducted for the National Center for 
State Courts demonstrates the importance of the cautionary instruction. The study re­
vealed that 37 percent of those interviewed wrongfully believed that it was the responsi­
bility of the defendant to prove his innocence rather than the responsibility of the State to 
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tion in Lakeside exacted a price on the defendant's silence by forcing 
him to forego his privilege to remain silent, in order to diminish any 
adverse inferences that might otherwise have been drawn as a result 
of the cautionary instruction. It cannot be said that pressuring a de­
fendant to take the witness stand is a constitutionally permissible 
means of protecting the defendant from adverse inferences. 
The Lakeside Court reasoned that the instruction did not exert 
the same kind of pressure on a defendant that was unacceptable in 
Gr(ffin pi In that case the unconstitutional compulsion was pro­
duced by comments from the prosecutor implying that the defend­
ant's silence was affirmative evidence of his guilt. 132 In Lakeside, 
however, the Court asserted that the purpose of the cautionary in­
struction was to remove adverse inferences. The instruction, there­
fore, was not a form of compulsion because it could not violate the 
constitutional principle it was intended to protect. 133 Under the 
Brooks rationale, however, the Lakeside argument loses force. In 
Brooks, the statute compelling the defendant to testify first was in­
validated because, in addition to stripping defendant of his privilege 
to remain silent, it took a tactical choice away from defense coun­
sel. I34 The judicial discretion in Lakeside, therefore, violated due 
process because it forced the defendant to forego a defense strategy. 
The Lakeside Court's determination that issuance of the instruction 
did not constitute a form of compulsion is inapplicable to the issue of 
the due process right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Within the tradition of the adversary process, the right to the 
prove guilt. Therefore, the instruction is designed to cure this misconception. 450 U.S. at 
303 n.21 (citing 64 A.B.A.J. 653 (1978». 
Nevertheless, the possibility remains that by calling attention to the fact that the 
defendant has not testified, a cautionary instruction may result in an effect other than the 
one intended: the jury may place specific emphasis on the defendant's failure to testify. 
Comment, supra note 36, at 585: 
Lack of knowledge of the events which occur in the jury room makes it difficult 
to postulate the effect which comment has upon a jury. However, it is more 
probable than not that the subtle adverse influence which the silence of an ac­
cused produces is augmented when it is specifically pointed out to a jury by an 
authoritative figure. 
/d.; Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND BASIC 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 184 (5th ed. Supp. 1981) (citing 2 Justice Assistance News 6 
(1981». This study states that the average juror probably understands only half of the 
jury instructions. Id. 
131. 435 U.S. at 339. See generally Berger, The Unprivileged Status of the Fifth 
Amendment Privilege, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 191, 195-98 (1978). 
132. 380 U.S. at 614-15. 
133. 435 U.S. at 339. 
134. 406 U.S. at 612-13. 
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effective assistance of counsel has been understood to mean the ab­
sence of any restrictions on the function of defense counsel \3S Lake­
side unfairly restricted defense counsel by nullifying defense strategy 
at the jury stage of the trial in contravention of the due process stan­
dards similar to those set forth in Herring v. New York .136 
In Herring, a state statute l37 conferred upon the judge the dis­
cretionary power to deny counsel the opportunity to present a clos­
ing argument. The statute was found to violate the due process right 
to effective assistance of counsel l38 To deny defense counsel the 
benefit of a closing argument denies the defendant the benefit of any 
positive inferences that the jury might draw from the closing argu­
ment. In its holding that due process was violated because of restric­
tions placed on the function of defense counsel,139 the Court stated 
that defense counsel had a right to make a closing argument regard­
less of the strength of the prosecution's case. l40 Total denial of such 
an opportunity deprived the accused of the basic right to make his 
defense. 141 
In a criminal trial, where the basic purpose is factfinding, the 
closing argument becomes an important opportunity to advance the 
evidence for both sides before submission to the jury. 142 Analogous 
to the constitutionally protected closing argument is the right of the 
defendant and his attorney to present the defense free from compul­
sion to testify. There can be no justification for a procedure that 
allows a trial judge complete discretion to deny a defendant the op­
portunity to choose whether his failure to testify should be com­
mented on. In denying defendant the benefit of counsel's ability to 
control jury inferences that might be drawn by defendant's silence, 
Lakeside violates due process because defendant was denied his ba­
sic right to the function of defense counsel 
Effective assistance of counsel was found to have been denied 
135. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 324, 344 (1980) (citing Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 
U.S. 605, 612-13 (1972); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1971); Ferguson v. 
Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 593-96 (1961»; Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975). 
136. 422 U.S. 853 (1975). 
137. Id. at 854-55 n.1. The statute states: "The court may in its discretion permit 
the parties to deliver summations. If the court grants permission to one party, it must 
grant it to the other also. If both parties deliver summations, the defendant's summation 
must be delivered first." Id. (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 320.20(3)(c) (1971». 
138. 422 U.S. at 863-65. 
139. Id. at 864-65. 
140. /d. at 859. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 862. 
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by statutes that: give a judge the exclusive determination of the mer­
its of an appeal;143 bar a defendant from having his testimony elic­
ited through direct examination by counsel; 144 restrict counsel's 
decision when to put a defendant on the witness stand; 145 and give a 
judge the discretionary power to deny closing arguments. 146 These 
procedures were impediments which constituted direct state interfer­
ence with a defendant's exercise of his fundamental due process right 
to effective assistance of counsel. 147 It would be incongruous for the 
Court to so scrupulously protect the right to effective assistance of 
counsel in these circumstances and reject the right under the circum­
stances presented in Lakeside. It would be a denial of the due pro­
cess right to effective assistance of counsel for the judge to give the 
cautionary instruction over the objection of the defendant. 
Carter, on the other hand, returned to defendant the due pro­
cess right to choose for himself the degree of his silence. 148 Carter 
placed in the hands of defense counsel the task of measuring the risk 
of adverse inference. 149 It became defense counsel's duty to request 
an instruction to "minimize the danger"150 of adverse inferences if 
he suspected that they may be drawn. 
Carter also recognized the need to protect the accused's right to 
the benefit of counsel. There, the Court stated that "a trial judge has 
a powerful tool at his disposal to protect the constitutional privi­
lege-the jury instruction-and he has an affirmative constitutional 
obligation to use that tool when a defendant seeks its employment ."151 
Carter clearly demonstrated that the Court is moving away from the 
narrow construction of the right to effective assistance of counsel 
presented in Lakeside. Carter did not expressly overrule Lakeside, 
143. 372 U.S. at 353. 
144. 365 U.S. at 570. 
145. 406 U.S. at 605. 
146. 422 U.S. at 853. 
147. United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196,201 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also Geders 
v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976), wherein a court order through which the defendant 
was denied the opportunity to see his attorney during an overnight recess infringed upon 
the constitutional right to effective counsel. The Court held that the state interest in 
preventing the possibility of influence on the defendant's testimony during the recess was 
not a compelling reason to override the right to the assistance and guidance of counsel. 
Trial strategies and tactics could be discussed during such recess and the sequestration of 
the defendant would prevent defense preparation. 425 U.S. 80, 88 (1976). 
148. 450 U.S. at 305 (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)). 
149. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text. 
150. 450 U.S. at 305. 
151. Id. at 303 (emphasis added). 
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but it did weaken the Lakeside rationale, making its continued vital­
ity doubtful. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Carter eliminated the uncertainties surrounding the cautionary 
instruction left unresolved by Griffin and Lakeside .152 Implicitly, the 
Carter decision stands for the proposition that the discretion of 
utilizing the cautionary jury instruction belongs to the defendant 153 
because it is attached to the privilege against self-incrimination, a 
privilege exclusively within the control of the accused and his 
attorney. 
The Supreme Court is placing a stronger emphasis on the indi­
vidual's free will and is not giving deference to the state policy inter­
ests that were invoked in Lakeside. Carter symbolizes that the Court 
is no longer reaching back to a traditional interpretation of the privi­
lege to remain silent but, instead, seems to be expanding the privi­
lege in the interest of due process. Carter reasserts the liberal policy 
justificationsl54 that underlie the privilege against self-incrimination 
to maximize protection for the individual criminal defendant. 
The cautionary jury instruction plays an important role in the 
criminal justice system. It is essential that its use comport with the 
highest level of due process protection. Carter satisfied this due pro­
cess requirement by providing the accused full benefit of his coun­
sel's expertise in exercising his discretion over the use of the 
cautionary instruction. Carter, therefore, severely threatens the 
Lakeside rationale by moving toward a more expansive protection 
of the privilege against self-incrimination, as well as a more expan­
sive view of the due process right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Patti Lee Hakes 
152. See supra notes 17,63-65 and accompanying text. 
153. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
154. Comment, supra note 36, at 591-94; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 36, § 2251 at 
318: 
The significant purposes of the privilege. . . are two: The first is to remove 
the right to an answer in the hard cores of instances where compulsion might 
lead to inhumanity, the principal inhumanity being abusive tactics by a zealous 
questioner. . .. The second is to comply with the prevailing ethic that the 
individual is sovereign and that proper rules of battle between government and 
individual require that the individual not be bothered for less than good reason 
and not be conscripted by his opponent to defeat himself. . . . 
Id. 
